GOOD BEHAVIOR TENURE AND
JUDICIAL POWER
Michael F. Close*
Obscure precedents, academic disagreement, and doctrinal
confusion characterize the present scope and application of the
tenure and salary requirements found in article III of the Constitution. In this article, Mr. Close examines the Supreme Court's
current pronouncement that Congress may create nontenured tribunals in the District of Columbia and commit both felony triaLs
and all post-conviction habeas corpus claims within the District to
these tribunals exclusive of article III courts. The author contends
that this position is inconsistent with the purpose of the tenure and
salary proviso of article III and that it is supported by a rationale
which is at best unclear. Offering alternative approaches to the
issue, Mr. Close concludes that once Congress decides to commit
inherently judicial business to a federal court that tribunal must be
tentured.
INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE AND MEANING OF
"GOOD BEHAVIOR" TENURE

To the framers of the Constitution the complete independence of
the federal courts was essential, for, it was asked, "[t]o what quarter
will you look for protection trom an infringement on the Constitution,
if you will not give [independent] power to the judiciary?"' When
James Madison was asked what would guarantee the Bill of Rights as
an effective check on the new government, he replied "independent
tribunals of justice." 2 Thus the article III proviso of good behavior
tenure 3 and undiminished salary was understood to be consitutionally necessary if the judges were to guarantee the Constitution to the
*A.B., Boston College; J.D., Georgetown University; Member, New York Bar, United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States District Courts for the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York.
1 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 554 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT]; THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 484 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton) [hereinafter cited as THE FEDERALIST].
2 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
Although good behavior tenure is commonly associated with the Act of Settlement, 12 &
13 Will. 3, ch. 2 § 3 (1700), which granted tenure to judges "quandiu se bene gesserint," the
concept actually dates as far back as Edward 1I1. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 125 (1973). The exact definition of good behavior tenure has perplexed constitutional scholars since its inception. The controversy has turned on whether "good behavior"
means life tenure and whether impeachment is the sole means for removal. See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 443-44 (2d ed. 1836) (Senator Stone, 1802) (misbehavior not necessarily
impeachable offense, hence, impeachment not exclusive); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No.
79, at 492-93 (A. Hamilton) (impeachment the sole method of removal). See generally S. 1423,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 1850, 8042, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (establishing proce-
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people. 4 Indeed, an overbearing legislature was so feared that at one
point during the Convention of 1787 it was proposed, 5 with tentative
agreement, that Congress not be permitted to increase judges'
salaries during their continuance in office, in anticipation that such
power would be used to influence their judgment. 6 The possibility
of' inflation during a long judicial tenure, however, made this proposal
impractical, and it was ultimately rejected. 7 It is also important to
note that judges of inferior federal courts were specifically included
within the tenure and salary guarantees of article III. This fact is
significant in view of the controversy over the establishment of lower
federal courts, for the proposal to create federal courts of original jurisdiction was not readily accepted at the Convention. Opponents of the
idea argued that state courts were the most appropriate tribunals to
hear cases in the first instance 8 and that the establishment of inferior
dures, other than impeachment, for removal of unfit federal judges); R. BERGER, supra at 12292; Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English & American Precedents, 1969
SuP. CT. REV. 135; Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of FederalJudges: Some Notes
From History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1969); Shartel, FederalJudges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930).
" THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78, at 484-87; 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 442 (J.
Mason in the Senate, 1800).
Article I11, section 1 of the Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
1 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22, 226, 230, 237, 244 (Farrand
ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].

6 Id. at 116, 126.
' 2 id. at 429-30. Madison, who trusted the judiciary over the legislature, favored the
proposal and was never completely reconciled to the Convention's decision. Id. at 45; see 3
ELLIOT, supra note 3, at 535 (Virginia ratification convention); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1,

No. 48, at 309, 311-13 (J. Madison).
The principle of insulating the judiciary from pressure by the other branches came under
question only once, and only Connecticut supported a proposal for a limited interference which
would have allowed removal by the executive upon the application of both houses of Congress.
2 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 423, 428-29. This proposal mirrored the concept of good behavior
tenure under the Act of Settlement. R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 125. Its express rejection
secured judicial freedom from the federal executive as well as the federal legislature.
Whether good behavior tenure guarantees that the judge will have any business to perform, or whether it merely guarantees him a salary, has never been decided. See Chandler v.
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 141-43 (1970) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting) (judges entitled to hear cases). When Congress abolished the Commerce Court, it was
argued that it could not abolish judgeships. 48 CONG. REC. 7992-98 (1912) (remarks of Sen.
Sutherland). Subsequently, the judges were transferred. Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat.
219.
a 1 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 119.
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federal courts constituted "an unnecessary encroachment on the
jurisdiction" of state courts. 9 The initial persuasiveness of these arguments induced the Convention to pass a motion to strike "inferior
tribunals" from the judiciary article. 10 This motion was ultimately
defeated, however, when James Madison and James Wilson, noting
the difference between establishing such courts absolutely and permitting the Congress to erect them if it chose, offered a compromise
that would give the federal legislature the power to create lower federal courts at its own discretion. 1 ' But while this grant of' authority
came under heavy attack in the state conventions, 1 2 the tenure and
salary limitations did not. 1 3 Thus, although power was grudgingly
yielded to Congress to enable it to utilize lower federal courts in
place of state courts, the power was yielded only upon the tenure and
salary limitations. 1 4 These limitations, which had served as a check
on executive despotism in England, 15 were seen as a means "to arrest
the overbearing temper" 16 of Congress. Hence, if the constitutional
language of article III and the intent of the framers are to be given
their proper effect, any exercise of "judicial power" 17 by the United
States must be subject to tenure and salary restraints.'

1 Id.

at 124; see 2 id. at 45-46.
1 id. at 118, 125.
11 Id. at 125.
12 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 408 (New York); 3 id. at 521-22, 569-70, 572
(Virginia); 4 id. at 136-37 (North Carolina).
13 2 id. at 489 (Pennsylvania); see 3 id. at 517 (Virginia). See generally THE FEDERALIST,
supra note 1, No. 78, at 483 (A. Hamilton).
14 See 3 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 393 (C. Morris, 1802). Governor Morris remarked:
lest a doubt should be raised, they have carefully connected the judges of both
With salutory caution they
[supreme and inferior] courts in the same sentence ....
devised this clause to arrest the overbearing temper which they knew belonged to
Legisltive bodies.
Id. Although this was said before the Senate in 1802, it clearly reflected the Convention's
intention to curb congressional power. See also 1 id. at 254 (Wilson); 2 id. at 79 (Ghorum).
At the Virginia ratification convention, some felt that the federal judges would not be sufficiently independent because of the federal legislature's power to increase their salaries. See 3
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 563-64.
15 R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 128-29.
16 3 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 393.
17 For a general discussion of the judicial power, see notes 114-47 infra and accompanying
10

text.
18 Article III also restricts the objects of the judicial power to "'cases" and "controversies,"
see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 722, 728-29 (1929), and delimits those
cases and controversies to which the judicial power may be extended. Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). These two restrictions serve to keep the judicial branch within
certain parameters as against the other branches of the federal government, see THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison), and within certain limits as between
the United States and the individual states. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 631-33 (1949) (Vinson, C.J. & Douglas, J., dissenting).
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As its history clearly shows, however, the tenure and salary
clause has not been read in any simple and direct manner. Rather,
this clause has been so beclouded by the expansion of an article I or
"legislative" 19 court theory, which is free of tenure restrictions, 20 that
its application has become ensnarled in a net of' "intellectual
chaos." 2 1 Two recent cases, Palnore v. United States22 and Swain
v. Pressley,23 confirm Justice Frankfurter's statement that "confused
and inadequate analysis is too apt gradually to lead to a course of
decisions that diverges from the true ends to be pursued." 2 4 Both
cases involved challenges, based on the tenure requirements of article
III, to the legitimacy of the District of' Columbia superior court and
court of appeals, each of' which was created by the congressional Re25
organization Act of' 1970 to hear local cases arising in the District.
These courts are presided over by judges appointed by the President
to serve fifteen year terms, and subject during that time to removal
by a commission. 26 This article will examine the Palmore and Pressley
cases and attempt to suggest approaches to the tenure question which

19 For a comparison of article I or "legislative" courts with article III or "constitutional"
courts, see Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect
on Judicial Assignment, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 133 (1962). The Note contains an admirable review
of the prior law and theories which this article will not attempt to repeat.
20 For a collection of opinions on the constitutionality of a proposed "article I" bankruptcy
court with plenary jurisdiction over all suits affecting the bankrupt, staffed by judges with fifteen year terms, see Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2682-2706
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings]. Compare 1976 Hearings, supra at 2685 (Dean Griswold's view) (Solicitor General in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973)) ("there is no
doubt" of constitutionality of bankruptcy court with nontenured judges under article I of the
Constitution) with id. at 2706 (Professor Wright's observation) (because Supreme Court has
confused this area of law so thoroughly, I can only say that "I don't know how many angels can
stand on the head of a pin until the Supreme Court tells me"). Under the new reform law
bankruptcy judges are appointed by the President to serve for a term of fourteen years. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 91-190, §§ 152, 153, 92 Stat. 2657.
21 P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 258 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER] (referring to Justice Sutherland's opinion in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S.
553 (1933) (holding Court of Claims judges are not protected by undiminishable salary)).
22 411 U.S. 389 (1973). For the most coherent analysis of the tenure clause as a restraint on
the exercise of federal power, see Brief for Appellant at 20-47, Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant], and Reply Brief for Appellant at 4-20,
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for Appellant].
23 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
24 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
25 See D.C. CODE §§ 11-502(3), -901, -923(2) (1973); Pressley, 430 U.S. at 375-77; Palmore,
411 U.S. at 392-93, 392 n.2.
26 See D.C.. CODE § 11-1502 (1973); Palmore, 411 U.S. at 392-93.
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would be more consistent with the purpose and intent of the tenure
and salary proviso of article III.
PALMORE V. UNITED STATES AND S WAIN V. PRESSLEY

Palmore, a resident of Maryland, 2 7 was prosecuted in the
Superior Court for the District of Columbia for the felony of carrying
an unregistered pistol. 2 8 Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment
for lack of jurisdiction, citing the tenure clause of article 111.29 He
also moved to suppress the pistol seized, alleging that it was the re-

Reply Brief Appellant, supra note 22, at 17.
D.C. CODE § 22-3204 (1973). Conviction carries a ten year maximum sentence.
29 Until the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, the local District of Columbia court's criminal jurisdiction which it
exercised concurrently with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, had
consisted solely of misdemeanors and petty offenses. D.C. CODE § 11-963 (1967). Its judgments
were reviewed by the District of Columbia court of appeals, which, in turn, was subject to
review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. § 11321(a).
The Act increased the number of "local" judges and, with a minor exception, shifted general criminal jurisdiction, including felonies, to the local District of Columbia court exclusively.
D.C. CODE §§ 11-502(3), -923(2) (1973). The District of Columbia court of appeals, moreover, is
no longer reviewed by the District of Columbia Circuit, but is instead reviewed by the Supreme Court. Id. § 11-102 (1973); 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976).
The judges of the Superior Court for the District of Columbia (Superior Court) and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals (D.C. Court of Appeals) hold office for fifteen year terms.
D.C. CODE § 11-1502 (1973). They are removable during that time, inter alia, for "conduct
which is prejudicial to the administration of justice or which brings the judicial office into disrepute," id. § 11-1526(a)(2)(C), by a commission three of whose five members are appointed by
the President. Id. § 11-1522(a)(1). It was of these latter provisions alone that Palmore complained. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 392-93, 392 n.2. For a comprehensive treatment of the Act,
see Williams, District of Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEO. L.J. 477 (1971).
The "judges" to which article III refers are the only appointed officers for whom the Constitution specifies any particular term of office. See generally Crenshaw v. United States, 134
U.S. 99, 107-08 (1890) (terms of midshipman's appointment may be subsequently altered by
legislation). The fifteen year tenure of the Superior Court judges, with a possibility of a reappointment, is within the general pattern Congress has provided for important administrators.
For example, members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System hold office for
fourteen years, subject to removal "for cause" by the President. 12 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1976).
Restricted removability is also a common feature of important officials whose function is of
judicial nature. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958) (President
cannot remove member of War Claims Commission where agency's function was of an "intrinsic
judicial character" and Congress had not provided him authority); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-30 (1935) (Federal Trade Commissioners may only be removed upon
limited grounds specified in Trade Commission Act). Cf. Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 275 U.S. 220,
227 (1927) (Board of Tax Appeals possesses appellate powers which are judicial in character). See
also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 76, §§ 7441, 7443(e), (f) (now I.R.C. §§ 7441, 7443(e), (f))
(Board of Tax Appeals shall be "an independent agency" with fixed term of office). For a discussion on the requirement of judicial review in the context of taxation, see note 93 infra.
27
28
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suit of an unlawfd arrest. 3 0 The District of Columbia superior court
denied both motions and he was subsequently convicted.3 1 He appealed to the District of Columbia court of appeals, where he also
challenged the jurisdiction of that court,3 2 and sought review on the
merits of his motion to suppress. Relying on National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co. 3 3 for the proposition that Congress could establish courts in the district under article I "wholly
separate and apart from its authority under article III," the court of
appeals sustained both its jurisdiction and that of the court below
against the tenure clause, 3 4 and affirmed on the merits the denial of

30 Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573, 574-75 (D.C. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 389,
396-97 (1973). Palmore's fourth amendment claim illustrates, perhaps, why a litigant would
prefer an inferior court with the "essential safeguard" of the tenure protections. See THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78, at 488 (A. Hamilton). Compare Palmore, 290 A.2d at
580-84 (upholding police stop to permit random license inspections) with United States v.
Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 878-80 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding same unconstitutional and disapproving Palmore's fourth amendment analysis).
The awkward and impolitic suggestion that the Superior Court and D.C. Court of Appeals
judges may be influenced in their actions by a concern for their appointments nonetheless is
firmly rooted in the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78, at 484 (A.
Hamilton). Lest the influence of outside pressures be thought merely "theoretical," consider the
case of Superior Court Judge Halleck. Considered a "liberal" judge, see Washington Post, Aug.
5, 1976, § C at 3, col. 2, id., June 10, 1976, § C at 3, col. 1 (rulings on juvenile centers and
women prisoners), who was often at odds with the United States attorneys, e.g., id., Mar. 12,
1976, § C at 2, col. 1; id., Jan. 21, 1976, § C at 1, col. 1, Judge Halleck found himself in a
bitter fight for his renomination, id., Oct. 27, 1976, § A at 1,col. 1 (Judge Halleck sues tenure
commission in United States district court), which he finally lost. Id., May 21, 1977, § A at 1,
col. 1 (President Carter will not renominate Judge Halleck). Certain United States attorneys
"unofficially" played a key role in denying renomination to their nemesis. Cohen Column, id.,
May 31, 1977, § C at 1, col, 1. The point is not whether Judge Halleck deserved to remain in
office, but that even if he did, the renomination procedure impeaches at least the appearance of
his neutrality. See id., Jan. 7, 1977, § C at 7, col. 3 (certain lawyers and friends of Judge
Halleck come to his aid). It has been remarked: "Periodical appointments, however regulated,
or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78, at 489 (A. Hamilton).
1 See Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573, 574-75 (D.C. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 389

(1973).
32 Id. at 575-80. Insofar as both the District of Columbia Superior Court and Court of
Appeals are "inferior courts" within the meaning of article I11,
and "tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court" under article I, section 8, clause 4 the same arguments apply to both courts.
Strangely enough, the article I clause has never been held to authorize "article 1" tribunals.
E.g., Palmore, 411 U.S. at 398; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (plurality
opinion).
33 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The Court, in National Mutual Insurance Co., upheld the jurisdiction of the United States district court in Maryland over a suit between a Virginia corporation
and a District of Columbia corporation over a contract governed by Maryland law. Id. at 583,
600.
' Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573, 575-80 (D.C. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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the motion to suppress.3 5 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the jurisdictional issue, but denied the writ on the
motion to suppress. 3 6 Affirming the lower court's decision, 3 7 the
Court held that Palmore was subject to federal sanctioning power in
the District of Columbia for a violation of the local criminal code
without the benefit of the tenure and salary provision of article 111.38
Following Palmore, the Court in Swain v. Pressley,3 9 extended
this holding to a habeas petitioner presenting a case arising under the
Constitution.4 0 In that case, Pressley petitioned the United States
a5 Id. at 580-84.
3 Palmore purported to perfect an appeal. Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at 2 (jurisdictional statement), 14-20. The Court postponed a notation of probable jurisdiction to a hearing
on the merits. 409 U.S. 840 (1972). The Court decided that review was by certiorari, not
appeal. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 396.
37 411 U.S. at 397 n.6. The denial of the writ on the fourth amendment issue apparently left
Palmore free to pursue his possible remedy on habeas. He petitioned the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, but that court, relying on D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (1973),
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Palmore v. Superior Court, 515 F.2d 1294, 1297 (1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 915 (1976). On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, en banc, construing section 110(g) as an exhaustion provision, since its habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 (1970), had not been amended. The Court granted the United
States' petition for a writ of certiorari, 424 U.S. 907 (1976), but then vacated and remanded
Palmore v. Superior Court for further consideration in light of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (federal habeas relief will not lie for suppression claims where state has provided an
opportunity for full litigation of federal claims). Superior Court v. Palmore, 429 U.S. 915 (1976).
38 411 U.S. at 410. Justice White's enthusiasm for a local court system in the District of
Columbia that did not provide for lifetime tenure coupled with the suggestion that the provision
of the 1970 Reorganization Act regarding the administration of the courts and judicial removal
and suspension might well become "a model for the States," id. at 409-10, ignores the fact that
good behavior was expected to be "the best expedient which can be devised in any government,
to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws." THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 1, No. 78, at 483 (A. Hamilton). For authority that the District of Columbia court's system
is "a model for the States," see People v. Horan, 20 CRIm. L. REP. (BNA) 2251 (Colo. Sup. Ct.,
Nov. 22, 1976) (holding neither due process nor equal protection were violated by tenure "at
the pleasure of the city council" while citing and relying on Palmore).
39 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
40 As a constitutional law case, Pressley is carefully evasive. The Court did not decide
whether Congress is obliged to allow review of the type of post conviction claim which Pressley
presented. 430 U.S. at 380 n.13. The right to a tenured decision maker might turn on this
question. HAST & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 341-44, 341 n.22; cf. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410, 419-20, 419 n.6 (1971) (hearing examiner not sufficiently independent to determine obscenity). If, however, the collateral attack is not a required remedy, it can only be because
Pressley's trial was itself an adequate forum for final determination of all constitutional claims.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 341-44, 341 n.22; cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 428-31, 443-44 (1944) (constitutional validity of regulation may be withdrawn as defense in
criminal trial where prior opportunity to challenge it before article III court deemed adequate).
Purportedly, Pressley raised no constitutional issue because the article III district court is
open if the superior court remedy is "inadequate or ineffective." 430 U.S. at 381. But see id. at
384-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (suspension clause does not require collateral review). But
since D.C. CODE § 2 3 -110(g) was held not to be an exhaustion provision, it is almost impossible
to imagine a case coming within the supposed exception. Clearly, it would not suffice to allege

1978]

GOOD BEHAVIOR TENURE

District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus
4
to test his detention pursuant to a conviction in the superior court. '
He alleged that he was denied the eflective assistance of counsel and
due process of law. 4 2 The district court dismissed the application on
the authority of' a provision in the District of Columbia code. This
provision stated that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on
behalf of' a prisoner authorized by the statute to apply for collateral
relief by motion in the superior court "shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or State Court if it appears that the
applicant has failed to make a motion for relief' under this section or
that the Superior Court has denied him relief."' 4 3 Reversing the district court, the United States Court of' Appeals for the District of'
Columbia circuit held that the prisoner had exhausted his local remedies and that he was required to do no more under the code before
filing a petition for habeas corpus in the district court.4 4 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of' appeals, holding that
the statute in question was not an exhaustion provision but in fact
precluded district court habeas corpus jurisdiction.4 5 Reading the
statute in this manner, the Court found that replacing collateral review before a tenured tribunal with habeas corpus review before a
nontenured tribunal did not violate either the tenure or suspension
that the superior court was wrong on the law, for this would be no different than exhaustion. In
re Galante, 437 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1971) (section 2255 remedy not "inadequate or ineffective"
because law in Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on effective assistance of counsel less
favorable than Third Circuit).. For the same reason, it cannot suffice to allege that the superior
court was wrong in finding the facts. See 430 U.S. at 383. Since the only difference between the
superior court and the district court is tenure, the only case conceivably left to the district court
is a habeas petition alleging that the judge's lack of tenure in the particular case had prejudiced
the result directly. The Court suggests as much. See 430 U.S. at 383 n.20. This overrules
Glidden, which held that the clause protects rights independently of any particular showing of
prejudice. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1962) (plurality opinion), 589-90
(Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting) (necessarily, by voting to reverse), 585--89 (Clark, J., & Warren, C.J., concurring) (implicitly, by reaching merits). Nevertheless, an allegation of partiality
would clearly state a denial of due process, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,
59-61 (1972), and thus Pressley reads the tenure clause as not granting anything not guaranteed
by due process alone.
41 Swain v. Pressley, 515 F.2d 1290, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
42 Id.

43 D.C. CODE § 23-110 (1973).
44 Swain v. Pressley, 515 F.2d 1290, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
45 430 U.S. at 377-78. As a statutory case, Pressley decided that "[h]ere the statute could
not be more plain [to exclude district court habeas]," 430 U.S. at 378 n.ll, without even citing
the statute thereby repealed in part, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). As a matter of precedent, it
chose to ignore Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950), which held that substantially similar
language from Article 53 of the Articles of War was merely an exhaustion of remedies provision
prior to habeas. 340 U.S. at 130 n.1, 132-33. For what reason the language in Pressley is
considered "more plain" than in Gusik the Court did not verbalize.
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clause of the Constitution. 46 Pressley's cursory citation to Palmore
indicates that Palmore's reasoning represents the Supreme Court's 4 7
48
definitive view of' the tenure clause.
46 430 U.S. at 381-84. The Court felt that the provision of the statute, allowing habeas
corpus application to the district court where it appears that the remedy in the District of
Columbia court is "inadequate or ineffective," made the new relief comparable to the previous
habeas corpus remedy and rendered the substitute remedy constitutional. Id. at 380-81.
47 In Pressley, Chief Justice Burger in an opinion joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Blackmun, purported not to decide the question of whether the suspension clause protects the
Jurisdiction of article III courts. 430 U.S. at 385-86. Thus, although the United States can
commit Pressley to prison without invoking the article III judicial power, and can keep him
there without affording him article III habeas, the Chief Justice did not see the suspension
clause as being implicated. He reasoned that at common law the writ was available: "(1) to
compel adherence to prescribed procedures in advance of trial; (2) to inquire into the cause of
commitment not pursuant to judicial process; [sic] and (3) to inquire whether a committing
court had proper jurisdiction." Id. at 385. Since Pressley's petition did not fall within any of
these categories, he could claim no rights under the suspension clause. However, since Chief
Justice Burger felt that Pressley's petition did not fall within category two, he implicitly decided
that article I courts are engaged in the judicial process within the meaning of the suspension
clause. See id. at 384-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part).
Compare Justice Brandeis' formulation of the same problem:
If there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be
subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative courts, it is not because of any prohibition against the diminution of the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts as such, but because, under certain
circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of
judicial process.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In an earlier decision, Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), Justice Brandeis applied this doctrine, holding that
due process required an article III hearing on the issue of citizenship in a deportation proceeding. Id. at 281-85. It must be understood that Pressley overruled Ng Fung Ho as a constitutional case (codified at 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1976)). The one difference is that the superior court
and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are subject to certiorari review by the Supreme
Court. But certiorari, which is "not a matter of right," Sup. CT. R. 19(1), does not provide for
Pressley what Justice Brandeis held was required for Gin Sang Get and Gin Sang Mo in Ng
Fung Ho. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 487-88 (Burton & Clark, JJ.), 489-97 (Frankfurter,
J.), 513 (Black & Douglas, JJ.) (1953) (denial of certiorari not to be given weight or merits in
subsequent habeas petition); Freund, Remarks by Paul A. Freund, Symposium-Habeas
Corpus-Proposalsfor Reform, 9 UTAH L. REv. 27 (1964) (concluding that institutional differences make certiorari unfit to substitute for habeas).
48 One could read Palmore as holding that "cases arising under ...
laws applicable only
within the District of Columbia," 411 U.S. at 410, may be enforced without the restraint of the
tenure clause. Indeed this is the sole basis for distinguishing O'Donoghue v. United States, 289
U.S. 516 (1933) (judges of former supreme court and court of appeals of District of Columbia
protected by article III salary guaranty). 411 U.S. at 406-07. Pressley's petition to the district
court presented a case arising under the sixth amendment and thus did not fall within Palmore's
"local law" rationale. Justice Stevens gave a very cursory answer to this possible "local" limitation of Palmore: "That holding necessarily determines that the judges of the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia must be presumed competent to decide all issues, including constitutional issues, that routinely arise in the trial of criminal cases." 430 U.S. at 383. This answer
was not inevitable. The competence of a tribunal to decide "questions" of a given law is distinct
from its competence to decide cases "arising under" that law. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke
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In contrast to the cursory opinion in Pressley, 49 the Palmore
opinion canvassed the constitutional landscape. It relied variously on
the inapplicability of the tenure clause to territorial courts, courts
martial, "legislative" courts, and the District of Columbia clause,
to sustain its result. Justly dissatisfied with its precedents,
Palmore then cited the inapplicability of the tenure clause to
state courts vindicating federal claims. 50 A careful analysis of

Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (state court may adjudicate issue of patent law which appears in
pleadings or testimony, although not case arising under patent laws); see Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 129 (1974) (action in quantum meruit does not arise under
federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) where federal law merely precludes
certain defense in such an action). Thus, the Palmore holding "necessarily determines" the
Pressley holding only if the District of Columbia code does not form a constitutionally distinct
body of law for purposes of the tenure clause (as it does not for any other purpose, see notes
105-06 & 108 infra). By itself the result is unexceptional; indeed, this is what Palmore argued,
Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at 29-46; but it clearly destroys any "local law" premise for
the holding of Palmore.
If there is a "local" rationale left after Pressley, it rests not upon the law to be enforced but
upon the place of enforcement. Hence a citizen has less constitutional protection of all his rights
when he enters the District of Columbia. This is what O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S.
516, 540 (1933), rejected. See 62 CoLuM. L. REV. 133, 154 n.149.
49 See notes 40 & 45 supra.
50 411 U.S. at 390-91, 400-03, 407, 409-10. Justice White demonstrated that Congress could
choose any court in which to sanction, including the prosecution of federal criminals in state
courts. Apparently Justice White insinuates that the clause therefore does not limit the federal government, since when it chooses to enforce federal law in a state court it does so in a court to which
the tenure and salary restrictions of article III do not apply. This turns Barron v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-50 (1833), on its head. Article III refers only to the
"judicial power of the United States." Whenever a state court hears a case involving federal law
(or any foreign law), the judicial power invoked is its own. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 220-23 (1916); cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
338 (1816) ("It is the case . .. and not the court, that gives the [appellate] jurisdiction"); THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 82 (A. Hamilton); Warren, Federal Criminal Laws & the State
Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 596-97 (1925). Although Justice White's argument was aptly
described as "almost cockeyed," Tushnet, Invitation to a Wedding: Some Thoughts on Article
III & a Problem of Statutory Interpretation, 60 IOWA L. REV. 937, 938 (1975), Justice Stevens
cited it favorably in Pressley. 430 U.S. 383 n.17. Two variations of the state court argument
deserve brief mention. If the fact that Congress "was not constitutionally required to create
inferior art. III courts," 411 U.S. at 401, implies that it may do so without the tenure restraints,
then by the same logic, the fact that Congress is not required to enact any criminal statutes
implies that it may do so in violation of the ex post facto clause. Similarly, the fact that Congress need not "invest them [federal courts] with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow
under art. 11I,"
411 U.S. at 401, merely remakes the same argument. That the state courts
might enforce federal laws, including criminal laws, e.g., Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 28, 1
Stat. 733, 740 (prosecution of postal crimes in state courts), is exactly the argument used at the
convention in 1787 against permitting Congress to create any lower federal courts at all. See
notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text. It hardly implies a grant of power to create courts
without the tenure restraints. See generally Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 54-55 (1924).
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both cases will show that Palmore misread its precedents and that the
51
tenure clause in the wake of Pressley is almost wholly advisory.
COURTS PRESIDED OVER BY NON-TENURED JUDGES

TerritorialCourts
The territorial courts would seem to provide the best authority to
sustain the Palmore and Pressley holdings. 52 Territorial courts exercise jurisdiction over criminal cases, including felonies, arising under
54
the laws of Congress, 53 as well as laws enacted in the territories.
51 Compare Pressley, 430 U.S. at 382 (dictum) ("We are fully cognizant of the critical importance of life tenure, particularly when judges are required to vindicate the constitutional rights
of persons who have been found guilty of criminal offenses") with id. at 382 n. 16 (tenure clause
was satisfied by certiorari jurisdiction of Supreme Court). But cf. United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 224 (1976) (post indictment line up held "critical stage" at which right to assistance to
counsel attaches).
52 Palmore, 411 U.S. at 402-03.
5 See id. at 403 n.ll. Laws enacted by Congress and applicable only to a particular territory are "laws of the United States" within the meaning of article III. E.g., Territory of Guam
v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195 (1977) (construing authority of Guam legislature under Organic Act for
Guam).
54 See 411 U.S. at 403 n.12. Local acts are also "laws of the United States" within the broad
meaning of article III. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1899) (appeal from judgment
of divorce from Supreme Court of Arizona). In Simms, in response to the argument that Barber
v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858) (family court matters beyond jurisdiction of federal
courts) precluded the appeal, the Court expressly decided that the doctrine had no application
either to the territorial courts or to its appellate jurisdiction from them. The appeal was dismissed, however, because a divorce could not be said to satisfy the requisite $5,000 in controversy and because it rested upon questions of fact, which the Court had no authority to
review. The Court decided the effect under local law of a local procedural point overlooked
below and thus, modified the judgment accordingly. This can only be done on the premise that
such a law is a law of the United States. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590, 632-33 (1875). The Court still insists upon its constitutional power to decide cases arising
under local laws. E.g., De Castro v. Board of Comm'rs, 322 U.S. 451, 454-59 (1944); Bonet v.
Texas Co. (Puerto Rico) Inc., 308 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1940).
The Simms answer is the correct one. The power exercised by territorial legislatures is
granted by Congress and subject to its revocation. National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U.S.
129, 133 (1879) (sustaining authority of Congress to nullify act of territorial legislature authorizing issuance of certain bonds). The same broad analysis of the "arising under" jurisdiction in
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823-24 (1824), would apply to territorial law. In every such instance, the authority of the local legislature or court under the applicable organic act would form an ingredient of the case. Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160,
173 (1864) (appellate jurisdiction rested upon Congressional legislative power); see Smith v.
Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1889). See also Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 545
(1927).
Local rules of decision are not, however, "laws of the United States" for purposes of the
statutory grants of jurisdiction either to the district courts, see Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter,
177 U.S. 505, 510 (1900), or the Supreme Court on appeal. See Ortega v. Lara, 202 U.S. 339,
340-43 (1906). The circuit courts of appeals, however, have long had jurisdiction over local cases
from territorial courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). E.g., C. Brewer Puerto Rico Inc. v. Corchado,
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Territorial judges need not hold office during good behavior. 55 Furthermore, as in the District of Columbia, "[i]n legislating for them,
Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state
government." 56 However, the history of the territories, together
with an examination of' the differences that exist between them and
the District of Columbia, will show that the example of these territorial courts cannot sustain the facile conclusion that the tenure and
57
salary protections are unnecessary in the nation's capital.
The territories were first governed by the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787,58 which preceded the Constitution and which 'was once referred to in the Northwest as "our constitution." 5 9 Unlike the
United States Constitution whose application to the territories was
not originally recognized, 60 the Northwest Ordinance did not contain
a separation of powers principle, nor did the territories adhere to
such principles. 6 1 When Congress succeeded the Confederation and
took control of the territories under its "general right of
sovereignty," 62 it was the contemporary understanding that the sep303 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1962) (construction of local statute); Electrical Research Prods. Inc. v.
Gross, 86 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1936) (common law action of replevin under Alaskan territorial
law). Jurisdiction can only be sustained on the grounds that such cases arise under the laws of
the United States for purposes of article 1II. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303,
303-04 (1809). For a detailed historical summary, see Blume & Brown, Territorial Courts &
Law, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39, 467 (1962).
55 McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 188-89 (1891). Hence, undiminished salary is
also inapplicable. See United States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143, 145 (1883).
56 411 U.S. at 403 (quoting American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828)).
57 See 411 U.S. at 403, 403 n.10. Except for McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174
(1891), discussed in notes 55 supra and 68 infra, none of the cases the Palmore Court cites in
note 10 have even a remote bearing on the issue tendered in Palmore. Each deals with a
procedural issue in a territorial court. Since it was not until 1938 that the first uniform civil
rules were adopted for the district courts, HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 674, the fact
that territorial and district courts followed different procedures has no constitutional significance. The Court chose to be rather selective in the recitation of its "consistent view." Compare
The "City of Panama," 101 U.S. 453 (1880) (admiralty jurisdiction vested in territorial court with

non-tenured judge) with Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 243-45 (1850) (federal court
within state with non-tenured judge cannot exercise admiralty jurisdiction).
58 See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a.
59 Blume & Brown, supra note 54, at 471.
60 Id.
61 See note 66 injra.
62 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
The territories can also be said to be governed under article IV which provides Congress
with the "power to dispose to and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Although this language does not readily
lend itself to a general power of sovereignty, which is in fact exercised, such power may be
implied. Cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 US. 44, 57 (1958) (power to regulate foreign affairs is
inherent in "law-making organ of the Nation" without specific Constitutional grant); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936) (foreign affairs said to be
implied rather than enumerated power).
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aration of powers principle did not limit Congress in providing for
63
territorial governments even after the adoption of the Constitution.
Consequently, Congress enjoyed a degree of flexibility in governing
the territories which it lacked at home. Historically then, the tenure
clause 6 4 was never applicable to the territories, since the separation
66
65
of powers principle upon which it rests was never accepted there.
The District of Columbia, however, is not a territory. 67 As to
the particular guarantees of' tenure and salary protections, two
63 Although the Northwest Ordinance granted good behavior tenure to its judges, it did so

independently of the tenure clause which it preceded. Good behavior tenure was a familiar
concept at common law, see note 3 supra, and although as a constitutional mandate it rests
upon the separation of powers principle, see note 65 supra, it may still be bestowed as a matter
of legislative grace. See note 64 infra.
64 Of course, Congress might choose to grant good behavior tenure to the territorial judges.
Blume & Brown, supra note 54, at 78-93.
65 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12 n.10 (1976); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78 (A.
Hamilton).
66 The First Congress provided that: "The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall
adopt and publish in the district, such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may be
necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district .
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8,
1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a (adopting Northwest Ordinance of 1787).
History will explain this radical departure from the separation of powers principle. The
Northwest Ordinance was adopted before the Constitution, and the Article of Confederation did
not mandate any tripartite division of powers. When the First Congress adopted the Northwest
Ordinance and amended it to conform to the new Constitution, it transferred the power of
appointing territorial officers from the Congress to the President. 1 Stat. 52-53. But apparently
the First Congress did not feel that the separation of powers was a constitutional mandate in the
territorial governments. The Northwest Ordinance remained the model for subsequent territorial legislation. Blume & Brown, supra note 54, at 43. Thus, when the great Chief Justice
decided that "the same limitation [of article III] does not extend to the territories," American
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), it was in the context of a body of law that
predated article III itself. Marshall rested the source of this power only alternatively on the
Constitution and spoke of a "general right of sovereignty" and the "general powers which [Congress] possesses over the territories of the United States." Id. For a judge who insisted on the
enumeration of powers principle, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819), this might seem inconsistent, but, at least in foreign affairs, the proposition that Congress succeeds to the powers of the Confederacy, even when not enumerated, perhaps reflects
the understanding of the times. 3 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 168-69 (Congress said to be
endowed with sovereignty of Confederacy); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 448-49 (debate on
Louisiana Treaty, 1803) (treaty attacked as unconstitutional and defended as extra-constitutional);
see note 62 supra. Compare Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1782) (circuit court
cannot act other than judicially) with Boggess v. Berry Corp., 233 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1956)
(territorial court not bound to judicial functions) (dictum).
67 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432 (1973).
As a general principle, the federal government is subject to fewer restraints outside the
United States than it is within. Entities nearer and more closely related to the federal government are subject to more restraints. To incorporated territories, i.e., those destined for statehood, the strictest standards apply. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1898) (petit jury
applies in incorporated territory); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1879) (grand
jury); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 459-60 (1850) (seventh amendment). In unincorporated territories the standards are not as strict. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 290-91
(1901) (White, J.) (only "fundamental" restrictions apply in unincorporated territories); Hawaii v.
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rationales have been advanced to justify a departure from the tenure
and salary clauses in the territories. One theory is that the transitory
nature of' the incorporated territorial governments made the permanent appointments of article III unworkable. 68 The second theory is
that the distance from Washington to the territories made the tenure
69
and salary protections less necessary to the judges' independence.
70
While the territories were not governed directly from Washington,
the District of Columbia "is itself the seat of the National Government" and within this area Congress may "observe and, to a large
extent, supervise the activities of' local officials."71 Furthermore, in
contrast to the status of a territory which "has aptly been described as
one of' pupilage at best,' "72 the District "is as lasting as the States
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211-12, 216-18 (1903) (nonunanimous criminal verdict allowed); Dorr
v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1904) (jury trial not demanded for crimes in Philippines); Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1922) (same); see 48 U.S.C. §§ 1661(c),
1681(a) (Supp. 1977) (Eastern Samoa & Trust Territory of the Pacific) (executive, legislative and
judicial powers to be vested in such persons and exercised as President shall direct). The fewest
restraints apply in areas not subject to United States control. "The Constitution can have no
operation in another country." In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). Since the obligations of
United'States citizenship are binding even abroad, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S.
717, 732-33 (1952) (death sentence for treason by dual national living in Japan during war
upheld), one would have thought that Ross was dead, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1957)
(plurality opinion), but Ross was revived by Palmore, 411 U.S. at 404.
Thus, within the group of cases from In re Ross to Thompson, O'Donoghue v. United
States, 289 U.S. 516, 535-45 (1933) (undiminishable salary guaranteed to District of Columbia
judge), recognized that the permanent seat of the federal government was rightfully protected
by all of the restraints on that government in favor of personal liberty and rejected the government's reliance on the territorial case law.
68 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-46 (1962) (plurality opinion); McAllister v.
United States, 141 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1891).
69 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962) (plurality opinion).
70 Id.
71 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 429 (1973) (footnote omitted); see, e.g.,
Ross v. United States ex rel. Prospect Hill Cemetery, 8 App. D.C. 32 (1896) (Congressional
attempt to control decision of local court); 117 CONG. REC. 32581-87 (remarks of Senator Byrd
criticizing superior court judge for dismissing prosecution and communicating his views to
commission on judicial tenure); Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1976, § B at 2, col. 3 (Senate Judiciary
Committee to probe allegations about Judge Halleck); id., May 7, 1976, § A at 1, col. 3 (Committee subpoenas Bar Association poll on Judge Halleck).
72 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 431 (1973) (quoting Nelson v. United
States, 30 F. 112, 115 (D. Ore. 1887)). See generally Presidential Proclamation No. 2695, 11
Fed. Reg. 7517, 60 Stat. 1352 (effective July 4, 1946) (independence to Philippines).
Like courts-martial, military commissions are bodies authorized by Congress to try offenses
against the laws of war in proper cases. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1976); e.g., id. § 904 (aiding enemy
triable to military commission); id. § 906 (spies: same). Both courts-martial and military commissions are "military tribunals, which are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article." Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942); see Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 251
(1863) (certiorari will not issue to review judgment of military commission, because it does not
exercise judicial power); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 200 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (same).
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from which it was carved or the union whose permanent capital it
became." 7 3 Thus, that "same confluence of' practical considerations
that dictated" that territorial courts need not be presided over by
tenured judges would have dictated precisely the opposite result in
74
Palmore and Pressley had the court discussed them.
Courts-Martial
Palmore also relied, in part, upon the example of the courts-martial to sustain the proposition that the judicial power invoked by the
United States in a felony prosecution need not be restrained by the
tenure and salary clause. 75 Court martial precedents, however, are
inapt because courts-martial are executive tribunals which do not
exercise "judicial power" as the Constitution defines it. 7 6 The power
Moreover, aspects of evidence and double jeopardy differ between courts-martial and article III courts. Compare U.C.M.J. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1976) (President may prescribe rules of
evidence and procedure in military courts) with United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,
147 (1871) (effect of evidence in judicial tribunal exclusively judicial function). Compare Swain
v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 557-58, 564-65 (1897) (President has power to return case to
court-martial for increased sentence under his general power to convene court-martial) with Ex
parte Lang, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 174-75 (1873) (payment of fine precludes imposition of
imprisonment in lieu thereof even where imprisonment might lawfully have been first imposed
by judicial tribunal).
73 O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 538 (1933).
74 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); Palmore, 411 U.S. at 404
(quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962) (plurality opinion)). For a different,
but not inconsistent, hypothesis, see note 66 supra.
75 411 U.S. at 404.
76 With respect to jurisdictional challenges to courts-martial, the Court has said:
Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and
naval offences in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations; and that
the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d article of
the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the
two powers are entirely independent of each other.
Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). "[T]rial of soldiers to maintain discipline is
merely incidental to an army's primary fighting function." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). "In essence, these tribunals are simply executive tribunals whose personnel are in the executive chain of command." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957) (plurality
opinion) (serviceman's wife not triable to court martial). "A court-martial ... remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (footnote omitted) (serviceman not
subject to court martial for crime not service connected).
The laws of war give executive a narrow authority to set up courts in conquered areas
immediately following the cessation- of hostilities. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 358 (1952)
(Allied court for occupation of Germany); Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 264-66 (1909)
(provisional tribunal in Puerto Rico following cession by Spain); Mechanics' Bank v. Union
Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 295 (1874); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 131-32 (1869)
(provisional courts upon conquest of Confederacy). International law, with Congressional approval, may sustain other courts. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1661(c), 1681(a) (Supp. 1978) (Presidential
authority over Eastern Samoa & Trust Territory of the Pacific).
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to try and punish members of the armed forces for military and naval
offenses, which is derived from article II, is not connected in any way
with article III of the Constitution and is limited only by the standards accepted and "practiced by civilized nations."77 The exercise
of this power serves "to maintain discipline" and is considered "incidental to an army's primary fighting function." 78 As a specialized
instrument for preserving discipline within the military apparatus,
courts-martial are not subject to the particular restraints and proce79
dures which the Constitution places upon the judicial power.
Hence, good behavior tenure is not applicable to courts-martial. 80
Because of' the particularized purpose and nature of' these courts,
their lack of' lifetime tenured judges does not provide sufficient precedent to sustain the Palmore decision. Indeed, previous military
case law suggested that article III itself circumscribed their jurisdiction.81
77 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
78 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
79 For example, fifth amendment grand juries and article III petit juries do not apply to
courts-martial. United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 784, 21 C.M.R. 98, 106 (1956)
(jurisdictional holding overruled by McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (overseas
civilian employee in non-capital case not subject to courtmartial)). The right of confrontation is
not applicable. See United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 222-24, 11 C.M.R. 220, 222-24
(1953) (deposition on written interrogatories taken without presence of accused admissible).
Double jeopardy is not constitutionally prohibited in court martial proceedings. Swain v. United
States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
By statute, sections, of the Bill of Rights prevail in court-martial proceedings. E.g.,
U.C.M.J. 27, 70, 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 870 (1976) (assistance of counsel); U.C.M.J. 31, 10 U.S.C.
§ 831 (1976) (self-incrimination). It has never been decided whether the Bill of Rights applies to
courts-martial proprio vigore or only by reference to the due process clause. See Mittendorf v.
Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 33-34 & nn.12 & 13 (1976). Compare Wiener, Courts-Martial & the Bill
of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 266 (1958) (Bill of Rights does not apply,
but urges due process approach) with Henderson, Courts-Martial & the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1957) (only grand and petit juries are to be
excluded). Apparently, Presidents Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams did not think that
the right to assistance of counsel, for example, applied to a court martial. Wiener, supra at
45-49.
80 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264-65 (1969); 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1976) (fifteen year
terms for members of United States Court of Military Appeals).
8 In striking down an assertion of court-martial jurisdiction over an ex-serviceman, the
Court in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), stated that "any expansion of
court-martial jurisdiction . . . necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up
under Article III ..
." Id. at 15; cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957) (proceeding on
similar analysis); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1902) (defendant cannot confer
court martial jurisdiction by consent; habeas allowed). See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 118-23 (9th ed. 1975).
The same restrictive rationale which circumscribes courts-martial also limits the other
executive tribunals. Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (enemy belligerent in wartime
not entitled to article III court) with Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122 (1866) (Constitution infringed upon when Milligan, a civilian, tried by a military commission "not ordained
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Legislative Courts
Palmore's citation to "legislative" court precedents, 8 2 accompanied by the obsequious suggestion that the same "practical considerations," 8 3 which justified the creation of these courts with judges
appointed for limited terms, 84 would also justify the absence of tenured judges in a federal court with general felony and habeas jurisdiction overstated the possible reach of these holdings. These judicial bodies
were conceptualized with a reasonable degree of clarity when the Supreme Court in Ex parte Bakelite 85 noted that legislative courts may serve
as "special tribunals to examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others, which from their nature do
86
not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it."
and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during good behavior")
(note, Milligan's holding did not turn on congressional consent). This restrictive view of the
congressional power to authorize executive trials remained the law a century later. See Kinsella
v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (article III held to invalidate overseas courtmartial of
civilian in non-capital case). The President's authority to establish provisional courts is also lim..
ited. See Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1851) (prize court in California
during Mexican War held invalid).
82 411 U.S. at 404 (citing United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 85-86 (1894) (Court of Private
Land Claims); Stephens v. Cherokee Nati6n, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); Ex parte Joins, 191 U.S. 93
(1903); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907) (Indian citizenship courts)).
83 411 U.S. at 404. What those "practical considerations" are, Justice White does not mention. Id. at 409-10. No attempt is made to demonstrate that the "local" nature of the court had
some "practical" impact on the tenure clause. The congressional attention was focused not on
the local nature of the court but on the advisability of good behavior tenure itself. See Hearings
on S. 1066 Before the Senate Comm. on the Districtof Columbia & the Senate Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 612-17, 633, 651-52, 808 (1969) (maintaining that tenure commission would remedy defects of excessive independence of life tenure).
The only real "practical" argument was that the impeachment process was too cumbersome a
method of removal. S. REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969). While this argument
might allow the judiciary to be given authority to police itself, R. BERGER, supra note 3, at
122-92, it does not sustain the broader proposition that the executive and legislative departments may do so other than by impeachment, and in any event is not a "local" argument. See
also Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the judges?, 53 VA. L. REV. 1266, 1276 (1967); notes 32, 38,
70 supra.
84 411 U.S. at 404 (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962) (plurality
opinion)).
85 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (writ of prohibition, to prevent Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
from acting beyond article III "case," denied).
86 Id.
at 451 (quoted in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 548-49 (1962) (plurality
opinion) (Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals have judges protected by
article III tenure and undiminishable salary)). Glidden did not undermine this proposition; it
expressly affirmed it. Justice Harlan's holding rested squarely on the proposition that "because
Congress may employ such tribunals assuredly does not mean that it must." Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 549. Since Justice Clark's concurrence rested upon the proposition that the
article III status of the courts had been conferred by legislation subsequent to Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438 (1929), and Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933), he must also be
read as agreeing with Justice Harlan on this point. 370 U.S. at 585-89 (Clark, J., concurring).
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When these various matters are analyzed, they represent a class of
business which historically either Congress or the executive might
have handled directly and so might have been disposed of indirectly
through nontenured administrators or judges. 8 7 Thus, patent
claims, 8 8 membership in the Indian tribes, 89 settlement of territorial
land claims, 90 private claims arising under treaty settlements, 9 1 or
payment of claims against the United States 92 may be dealt with directly by Congress or the executive. The Government may, by entrusting these matters to some person or agency, avoid resorting to
article III power. 93 If the business be of a kind which is capable of
87

See notes 88--93 infra.

88 Congress might itself grant a patent. See, e.g., Priv. L. No. 93-60, 88 Stat. 2368 (1974)

(altering patent laws in favor of private applicant). It might delegate that task to an executive
agency. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (Secretaries of State, War & Attorney
General to grant letters patent to applicants, subject to presidential review). It might commit
the work to an article III court. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). Obviously, the
difference between an "article I" or "legislative" court and an executive agency is purely in
name. See note 29 supra.
89 See note 82 supra. Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907), sustained a congressional
revision of the United States Court for the Southern District of the Indian Territory precisely
on the ground that Congress itself had complete power over these questions. Id. at 421-25.
90 United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 85-86 (1894) (upholding legislative court settlement of
private land claims in territories; expressly limiting holding to territories); Astiazaran v. Santa
Rita Land & Mining Co., 148 U.S. 80, 81-83 (1893) (private land claim in territory cannot be
judicially contested while congressional resolution of such claims is pending); Vance v. Burbank,
101 U.S. 514 (1879) (Land Department's denial of patent for certain lands held not subject to
judicial review); Tameling v. United States Freehold Co., 93 U.S. 644, 662-63 (1877) (congressional action confirming private land claims in territory not subject to judicial review).
91 Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363, 379 (1868) (legislative settlement of claims
under Mexican law to San Francisco property); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 423, 459-61 (1899) (same power asserted) (dictum).
92 E.g., Priv. L. No. 93-80, 88 Stat. 2375 (1974) (settlement of claim against United States);
De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419, 430-33 (1867) (congressional act held to
control decisions of court of claims); Act of Mar. 4, 1931, ch. 522, tit. 11I,§ 3, 46 Stat. 1552,
1622 (vacating and remanding judgment against United States in Pocono Pines Assembly Hotel
Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 91 (1930)); see Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1944)
(private legislation may direct court of claims to redetermine suit previously rejected, on
rationale that the act created a new cause of action). cf. United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328,
331 (1919) (Treasury Department may finally determine reimbursement to military officer for
property lost in service without judicial review).
93 Article I, section 8, clause 1 provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power...
[t]o lay
and collect Taxes;" accordingly, it may do so without resort to the judicial process. Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1931). However, Congress has never attempted to lay
and collect taxes without allowing the taxpayer some opportunity for judicial review, HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 332-34 (The Dialogue). Thus, the tax court was said to be "an
independent agency in the Executive Branch," Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 76, § 7441, 68A
Stat. 879 (1954) (before 1969 amendment), or an "article I court." Id. § 7441, as amended by
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (1969). Its "judges" hold office for fifteen year terms,
subject to possible removal. Id. § 7443(e), (f).
The congressional power over other matters is also broad. See, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa
v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335-38 (1932) (fines may be imposed without judicial action upon
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judicial resolution, 94 Congress may choose to entrust it to an article
III court if the matter presents a "case" 95 within the meaning of that
article and the finality and independence 96 of that branch are respected. This is the class of business whose "mode of determining
97
.. . is completely within congressional control."
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ARGUMENT

Pahnore might have been read as a holding limited to "cases arising under . .. laws applicable only within the District of Columbia."98 But although Congress possesses the power to legislate
within the district in the same way that a state may pass laws, 9 9
"[t]his power, like all others which are specified, is conferred on
Congress as the legislature of' the Union: for, strip them of that
character, and they would not possess it." 100

Of course, it is only in

persons importing diseased aliens); Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214, 219-22 (1893);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892) (admission proceeding; habeas)
(power to forbid foreign national to land "belongs to the political department" and correctness of
factual determination not subject to judicial review); Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310,
323-26 (1890) (Treasury Department appraisers may make final decision on dutiable value of
imported merchandise without judicial redetermination).
Congressional authority over immigration continues to be broadly viewed. Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 791-92 (1977) (sustaining classifications based on illegitimacy and gender); Priv.
L. No. 93-58, 88 Stat. 2367 (1974) (private immigration act).
94 Compare Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38-43 (1849) (political legitimacy of state
government cannot be judicially determined) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (equality
of representation is judicial question).
95 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 722, 728-29 (1929) (review of Tax
Court (then Board of Tax Appeals) held article III "'case"); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S.
568, 568-69 (1926) (uncontested award of naturalization presents article I11"case:').
96 Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948)
(presidential review of decisions precludes jurisdiction to review CAB orders).
7 279 U.S. at 451.
98 411 U.S. at 410.

99 Id. at 397 (quoting Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899)). Like United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), discussed in note 81 supra, Capital Traction
was an odd case for Justice White to cite in-view of its outcome. See note 126 irfra.
100 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 424 (1821).
Thus such laws are "laws of the United States" within the meaning of article III. See, e.g.,
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 488 (1950) ("[I]n the District
of Columbia, the appellate jurisdiction given to the supreme court, can be maintained only on
the ground that the laws of the district are laws of the United States .. ");American Ins. Co.
v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 523 n.a, aff'gjuris., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 554 (1828); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 557-63 (1966) (procedural issue in juvenile court); Fisher v. United States,
328 U.S. 463, 467-68, 476 (1946) (local murder statute and appropriate jury instructions).
For the same reason, rights claimed under a District of Columbia statute are federal rights
within the meaning of the supremacy clause. See, e.g., Ancient Egyptian Order v. Michaux, 279
U.S. 737, 744-45 (1929) (reviewing state court decision).

1978]

GOOD BEHAVIOR TENURE

its character as a national legislature that Congress can exercise
this power, "for, it is in that character alone, that the constitution
confers on them this power of exclusive legislation." 101 In contrast,
state courts are not federal courts and therefore do not exercise the
"judicial power" of the United States. 10 2 The purpose of the tenure
clause was to restrain the federal government, not the states.' 0 3 As
the nation's capital, though, the District of Columbia is guaranteed all
the protections secured by the constitutional restraints on the federal
government in favor of' personal liberty. 10 4 Accordingly, Congress
10 5
does not stand to the district as a state legislature to a state.
Furthermore, Congress' power is restricted to "legislation," 106 and

Contrary to frequent suggestions, e.g., Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV.
894, 903 (1930), the common law jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts also presents
cases arising under the "laws of the United States" for purposes of article III. Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)
(Holmes, Brandeis & Stone, JJ., dissenting) (Court observed that common law "whether called
common law or not, is not common law generally but the law of that state existing by the
authority of that state"). Since the sovereign in the district is the United States, Metropolitan
R.R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 9 (1889) (dictum) (interpreting common law
statute of limitations); United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 647, 657-58 (C.C.D.C. 1833)
("local" crime properly cognizable in article II court), it is its authority by which the law exists
in District of Columbia. See Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9 (1882) (judgment of District of
Columbia court in common law case to be given recognition as federal judgment under supremacy clause). All such common law cases can be said to arise under the Organic Act for the
District of Columbia, Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, §§ 1, 3, 5, 2 Stat. 103, granting jurisdiction
to the circuit court in cases of law and equity, where either or both parties shall be found or
resident within District of Columbia. Compare Pang-Tsu Mow v. Republic of China, 201 F.2d
195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (suit between aliens sustained) with
Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) (suit between aliens does .not fall within
article II1by virtue of parties). The Superior Court now exercises the common law jurisdiction
of the first circuit court. D.C. CODE § 11-921 (1973).
101 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 424 (1821).
102 See note 50 supra.
The converse proposition is also true. Federal courts, when hearing cases governed by state
law (or any foreign law), exercise the judicial power of the United States and are governed by
the attributes of that power. See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (federal rules
govern all proceedings in federal courts); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S.
525, 533-40 (1958) (particular issue for jury, not judge, despite contrary state law); Herron v.
Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931) (directing a verdict governed by federal, not state, law).
103 See notes
1-6, 14-18 supra and accompanying text. Since the impeachment
power extends only to the President, Vice President, and civil officers of the United States,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, state judges enjoy an independence from Congress that is not shared
by article III judges.
1' O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535-45 (1933).
105 See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
'06U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.17. Thus, Congress is not given power to try and punish
Palmore for a felony. See notes 148 & 149 infra and accompanying text.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:208

neither prior to 107 nor subsequent to 108 Palnore has anyone on the
Court ever suggested that article I, section 8, clause 17 formed a
body of law distinct from the other clauses of article I, section 8 as to
its manner of enforcement. 10 9 At any rate, Pressley made it clear
that, if the Palmore holding were limited at all, it would be limited
not by the character of the law to be enforced but by the place of
enforcement. 110 However the Constitution defines federal "matters
of strictly local concern," I" the application of this proposition to the
107 United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, appeal dismissed, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 172
(1805) (article III salary guaranty extended to "local" justice of the peace). Compare Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899) (seventh amendment applicable to "local" cases) with
Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1045 (E.D. La.), aff'd mem. sub nom., Mayes v.
Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) (seventh amendment not applicable to states). Compare District of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 74 (1930) (article III jury guaranteed for District of Columbia
code offense) and Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548-50 (1888) (jury guarantee for District of
Columbia code offense rested on article III and sixth amendment) with Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581, 586 (1900) (petit jury not then incorporated into fourteenth amendment). Compare
United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922) (grand jury required for District of Columbia
code case) with Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (grand juries not required of states).
Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (fourteenth amendment prohibits racial
segregation in public schools) with Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial discrimination
prohibited by fifth amendment in District of Columbia).
08 Compare Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (statute abolishing jury trial
in local landlord-tenant disputes unanimously held unconstitutional) with Alexander v. Virginia,
413 U.S. 836 (1973) (seventh amendment inapplicable to state).
109 Three moribund "hybrid" cases have held that Congress may confer administrative or
legislative powers upon the District of Columbia courts, subject to the guarantees of personal
liberty in the Constitution: Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 443 (1923) (holding that power to amend an order which established utility rates was "legislative"); Federal
Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 467 (1930) (holding that an order to Radio
Commission to grant license was "administrative"); Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut
Co., 272 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1927) (holding that limited res judicata effect of judgment of Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia in trademark inter partes proceeding prevented an article
III "case" from being presented).
However, the rationale of these three cases does not survive. Keller is no longer valid as
applied to its facts. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 580 n.53 (1962) (plurality opinion);
see United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 369 (1967). In regard to General
Electric, the "proposition that the granting or renewal of a license is 'purely administrative,'
seems in the perspective of the 1970's a little queer ..
" K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT 536 (3d ed. 1972). Thus, there never has been a "hybrid" court system in the District of
Columbia. The above cases were "ill-considered decisions" in a "relatively new subject." HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 340 (The Dialogue).
Justice Jackson, accepting the "hybrid" theory, logically extended it beyond the District of
Columbia. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 589-604 (1949)
(plurality opinion rejected by a majority). There is nothing peculiarly local about rate-making,
licensing or trademarks. Only Keller could, in fact, be grounded upon article I, section 8, clause
17.

110 See note 48 supra.

I"' Palmore, 411 U.S. at 407. Notice that under the Palmore-Pressley formulation, if a "local"
statute infringes upon a "national" right, e.g., freedom of speech, the national right is no longer
protected by the tenure guaranty. Precisely what statutes of Congress are constitutionally
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District of Columbia was exactly what O'Donoghue v. United
States 112 rejected.113
DRAWING THE LINE: INHERENTLY JUDICIAL BUSINESS

Until Palmore, it was recognized however that some business
was "inherently" judicial, that is, that it not merely permits but requires a judicial, as opposed to executive or legislative, determination. 11 4 This proposition necessarily follows from the separation of
powers principle. Were it otherwise, the executive and legislative
branches would entirely supplant the judiciary.115 If a line is not
drawn to contain the expansive jurisdiction of "legislative" or "article I"
courts, Congress may circumvent at will what was thought to be the
most effective check on its power. 1 16 A distinction, therefore, must be
"local" is difficult to forecast. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 000 (1977).
Within the District of Columbia, the Palinore-Pressley rulings could produce anomalous
results. For example, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 to 928 (1976) (firearms), interstate commerce
includes "commerce ... within . . . the District of Columbia." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) (1976). If a

defendant can show that a given firearm crossed the district line, could he then demand a
tenured judge? Even if the Palmore-Pressley formulation is limited to article 1,§ 8, cl.17 of the
Constitution, every prosecution under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (1970),
falls within it. Note the problem of overlapping jurisdiction. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1751
(1976) (murder of federal official) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 4704(a), 4723 (1976) (drugs) with D.C. CODE
§ 22-2401 (1973) (murder) and D.C. CODE § 33-402 (1973) (drugs).
It is interesting to note that approximately twenty-three percent of the United States
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii) constitutes the federal public lands. Report of the Interdepartmental Comm. for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Pt. 1,
123 (1956), in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 1269. The article IV property power gives
Congress proprietorship, as well as legislative jurisdiction, over the public lands. Such congressional power overrides state law by virtue of the supremacy clause. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529 (1976) (rejecting contrary argument).
112 289 U.S. 516, 540 (1933).
113 See notes 5, 48 & 67 supra.
114 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549 (1962) (plurality opinion) (dictum); Ex parte
Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438, 453, 458 (1929) (dictum); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280-81, 284 (1856) (dictum). For a discussion on the
characterization of inherently judicial business and its relation to federal habeas corpus review,
see note 47 supra.
15
Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 48 (1787) (holding statute depriving certain litigants of a
judicial determination of title to land unconstitutional). Even Louis Boudin, who was hostile to
the claim that the judiciary had any general power to declare statutes unconstitutional, 1 L.
BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, iii-viii (1932), accepted at least this premise.
[T]he question [in Bayard] was . . . whether there should be a trial at all-that is
to say, whether the judges had a right to hear the case. And one need not be a
supporter of the Judicial Power in any of its formulations in order to believe that
the Judiciary have a right to hear and determine cases. . . . [and] that the Legislature may not abolish all courts when the Constitution provides for their existence.
Id. at 66.
116 See notes 1, 2, 14 & 71 supra.
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drawn between what may be thought of as inherently judicial business
and that which is of a legislative or executive character.
A thorough analysis of the problem would require a sensitive regard for precedent, for "judicial power" is not a self-defining term.
Rather, it "sums up the whole history of the administration of justice
in English and American courts through the centuries." 117 However, some possible approaches may be suggested, although it should
be borne in mind that while the extreme position of Palmore and
Pressley is rejected, the other extreme-that every adjudicatory tribunal must be staffed by a tenured judge l18 -is also untenable on
historical grounds. For example, a board of commissioners was approved by the First Congress to settle accounts between the United
States and the individual states, 1 19 even though such suits were
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 120 Moreover,
history will show that, even in the criminal field, "judicial power" did
not necessarily include every case. 12 1 If it includes anything in the
civil law, it certainly includes whatever rights are protected tnder the

suspension clause. 122
One possible approach would be to view the right to an article
III tribunal as having been subsumed under those particular constitutional guarantees which govern the federal judicial process. 123 For

117 Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedurein Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" FederalCourts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1017 (1924).
158 E.g., Tushnet, supra note 50, at 957.
119 Act of Aug. 5, 1789, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 49.
120 United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 639-40 (1892).
121 There is a class of "petty" offenses which do not require the full protection of the judicial
process for their adjudication. Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses & the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926); Doub & Kestenbaum, Federal
Magistratesfor the Trial of Petty Offenses: Need & Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 443,
462-67 (1959). Palmore did not argue that a tenured judge was needed for every parking ticket.
See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at 12-13. The historical answer is that the justice
of the peace was known to the Framers and they provided tenure only for "judges." However,
this does not mean the justice of the peace can take over the judge's job. Note, The Validity of
United States Magistrates' CriminalJurisdiction, 60 VA. L. REV. 697, 704-05 (1974) (drawing an
historical distinction between "minor" and "petty" offenses and concluding that magistrates are
restricted to the latter). See also S. 1613, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (expands jurisdiction of
magistrates). The only constitutional difference between Superior Court judges and United
States Commissioners is that the latter are appointed by the district judges for eight year terms
and removable by them only, 28 U.S.C. § 631(a), (h) (1970), and thus are more insulated from
the influence of the other branches. Superior court judges are removable by a commission
dominated by presidential appointees. D.C. CODE §§ 11-1521,-1522 (1973).
122 Pressley, 430 U.S. at 384-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 281-85 (1922).
12 Palmore, 411 U.S. at 414-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (semble); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 598-602 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (semble).
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instance, since the article III right to a jury trial applies to crimes
with possible imprisonment exceeding six months,' 2 4 one might then
conclude that within this class of crimes "the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process" 125 which
includes the peculiarly federal judicial guarantee of a judge with good
behavior tenure. Similarly, one can read the seventh amendment to
include the presumption that the business within its scope be en26
trusted to an article III tribunal; in fact, it has been so interpreted.1
By a parity of reasoning, the right to a grand jury indictment guarantees an article Ill court to which the indictment is returnable, and
this was also once the Supreme Court's view of the law.' 2 7 This
approach falters, however, with admiralty cases and cases at equity,
because the Constitution specifies no procedures for them. Therefore,
an appeal to some historical precedent outside the text of the Constitution, rather than the Delphic reference to "judicial power," is
28
necessary. 1

124 See Cheff v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S. 373, 378-80 (1966).

In Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), the government argued that only the
sixth amendment, and not the seventh, stood between it and the citizen. Id. at 449-50 n.6.
Assuming this proposition, and applying it to its extreme, it follows that between the government and the individual only the "trial of all crimes" is inherently judicial. However, this would
still afford a significant review of the government's actions. Primarily, the extent to which the
government could affirmatively injure anyone without resort to the judicial process is thereby
limited. E.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958) (judicial review of less than
honorable discharge); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922) ("tax" held "penalty;" collection enjoined). The central question would be what scope of review would be available to a
defendant when the government sought to enforce its decisions with criminal sanctions. It
seems clear that the constitutionality of the underlying legislation could not be withdrawn. See
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-68 & n.8 (1974). The regularity and fairness of the
proceedings which lead to the formulation of an enforceable duty needed to conform to due
process, is a question open to the court. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). But see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 22, at
341-44 (The Dialogue). A defect in this approach is that if there is a right to a judicial hearing
in cases like Johnson v. Robison, it does not rest upon the "trial of all crimes."
125 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
121 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1899) (trial by jury of twelve before
justice of the peace not trial by jury within meaning of seventh amendment). Note that the
Organic Act for the District of Columbia, Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 107,
provided that justices of the peace, who held office for five year terms, could try private suits
only to the value of twenty dollars.
In some recent decisions the "judge" guarantee of Capital Traction has been eroded. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), which applied the seventh amendment to the
superior court (note 121 supra), overruled, by implication, Capital Traction, regarding this
issue. Moreover, dicta in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442, 451-57 (1977), might lead
one to believe that there is no "jury" guarantee either.
127 Forsyth v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 570, 575-77 (1850).
128 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 117, at 1016-23. See generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 121.
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Another possible approach is represented by a class of administrative cases which involve alleged governmental transgressions
against constitutional rights.' 2 9 These cases stand for the proposition
"that the judicial function vested in the courts by article III encompasses a power-perhaps a duty-to determine de novo the relevant
facts in all cases involving constitutional limits."130 Hence, if the
Government's authority to seize and suppress books, for example, is
limited to the "constitutional fact of obscenity," 131 then only a "fully
judicial," 132 that is, article III, tribunal could determine the facts and
apply the law to them. Similarly, since the Government has no authority to take private property except upon payment of just compensation, an article III court must be satisfied that the compensation
paid was just.1 3 3 On the other hand, since no particular amount of
taxation represents the constitutional limit of the taxing power, it
would be unnecessary for the taxpayer to have an article III court
pass upon the correctness of his tax bill. Of course, due process demands that both the correct law be applied and a fair method of assessment be employed. For this more limited constitutional inquiry
Justice Brandeis's formulation in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States 134 "that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide
whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly,"
serves adequately. 13 5 The record upon which review is to be granted
129 See, e.g.,

Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 412-22, 418-19 n.56 (1971) (determination of

obscenity); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (same); St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51-54 (1936) (constitutionality of order); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-61 (1932) (agency's constitutional power); Ng Fung Ho v. white, 259 U.S.

276, 281-85 (1922) (review of deportation); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253
U.S. 287, 289 (1920) (award of just compensation).
130 Jaffee, Judicial Review: Constitutional & JurisdictionalFact, 70 HARV'. L. REv. 953, 975
(1957); see Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
983 (1977) (first amendment demands "more searching" judicial examination of agency action);
McKinney v. Parsons, 488 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 1974) (district judge, not merely magistrate,
must view "obscene" materials).

131 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 102 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 418 n.5; see id. at 419 n.6.
133 See United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923) (just compensation is judicial, not executive or legislative, determination).
134 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
135 Id. at 84 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 343
n.23 (The Dialogue).
Justice Brandeis was correct in asserting that the majority's position was basically that a

judge has greater power to set aside an administrative finding of fact than he does to set aside a
jury's verdict. 298 U.S. at 84. Justice Black indirectly answered him in United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 n.ll (1955), when he gave support to a statement from II
WILSON'S WoRKs 222 (Andrews ed. 1896): "Juries undoubtedly may make mistakes ....
But
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in "constitutional" cases was loosely defined by the majority in St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. as comprising those facts presented at the
hearing below, unless they are clearly "overborne" by other evidence.1 36 In this respect, Crowell v. Benson,137 supporting de novo
review of administrative records, 138 is not to be regarded as a seminal
39
opinion. 1
The virtue of this latter approach is that it ties the application of'
the tenure clause to its purpose. The judiciary was "designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority." 140 As Professor Jaflee suggests, where the federal
sovereign attempts to make a final determination in law respecting
fundamental rights, an article III court is necessary.' 4 1 For if a court
with "complete independence" 142 cannot pass upon the question, the
"particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing." 143
This
formulation is the very least required to preserve a separate grant of
judicial power.
One objection to this approach, however, is that it surely reads
the tenure clause for less than it might be worth. It was not constitutional violations alone that Hamilton thought the clause protected; 144
allowing decisions of' nonconstitutional issues by nontenured judges

changed as they constantly are, their errors and mistakes can never grow into a dangerous

system.'"
136 298 U.S. at 53-54.
137 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
13 Id. at 57.
139 See Strong, Judicial Review: A Tridimensional Concept of Administrative -Constitutional
Law, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 249, 274-75 (1967).
140 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78, at 485 (A. Hamilton); accord, Powell v. McCor-

mack, 395 U.S. 486, 547-50 (1969). Hamilton's statement applies as well to the executive.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952).
141 See Jaffee, supra note 130, at 975, 984-85; see, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57

(1932). However, Crowell seems to be wrong in applying its theory (court must review finding
of facts necessary to sustain the constitutionality of the government's action) to its facts (enjoin-

ing the enforcement of an award of compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). Surely a common law employment relationship does not represent a
constitutional limit upon the imposition of liability, as Justice Brandeis contended. Id. at 81-84.
142 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78, at 484 (A. Hamilton).
143 Id. at 485.

144 Id. at 488-89. This larger view of the purpose of the tenure clause was expressed by
Hamilton:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the indepen-

dence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the inquiry of the

private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws.
Id. at 488.
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presiding over article I administrative proceedings undercuts the
scope of this clause. On the other hand, the historically demonstrable
purpose of this clause is clear only as a protection for "constitutional"
rights. l4 5 Apparently, even an administrative agency established
under article I may ultimately interpret its own law, excluding constitutional issues, 146 although it is not clear exactly what "law" is in4 7
cluded in this interpretation.1
But however one draws the line, Palmore steps over it. Not only
is the "trial of all crimes" mentioned in the text of article III itself,
but such a trial is further surrounded with the judicial safeguards of
the fifth and sixth amendments. In addition, the necessity of a filly
judicial proceeding before the imposition of punishment is further
manifested by the bill of attainder 148 clause, which generally prohibits any legislative imposition of punishment. 1 49 The executive is
equally powerless to enforce a sentence of imprisonment without a
judicial trial.150 Viewing the issue in a constitutional light, Palmore's
deprivation of liberty cannot be made "without the sanction afforded
by [federal] judicial proceedings," as the government's authority to
imprison Palmore for ten years is constitutionally limited to a finding
15 1
that he violated the applicable criminal statute.
Pressley, however, completely divorced the concept of "judicial
proceedings" from article III. The issue there was whether one who
has been convicted and sentenced without "full judicial participa-

117-19 (1969).
146 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-68 (1974) (Congress may preclude courts of
145 R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT

United States from reviewing question of law arising under statute, although it may'not preclude review of issues arising under Constitution).
147 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 340-41 (The Dialogue).
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3.
149 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46 (1965) (disability imposed upon Communist
party members prohibited); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (prohibition
against payment of salary to three named employees invalid).
Of course, Congress may punish its own members for "disorderly behavior," U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 5, cl.2, and may punish a nonmember for contempt, Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (compelling attendance of witness); McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927) (witness' refusal to answer questions). But this power is limited to the
"right to prevent acts which in and of themselves inherently obstruct or prevent the discharge

of legislative duty." Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917).
The contempt power is now customarily enforced through the judicial power. 2 U.S.C. §
192 (1976); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
1so Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.

228, 237-38 (1896) (imprisonment for one year at

hard labor cannot be imposed except upon judicial action); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2, 122 (1866); see United States v. Berry, 4 F. 779, 780 (D. Colo. 1880) (limiting authority of
United States commissioner to act in criminal matters).

151Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1921).
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tion" 15 2 may nonetheless have a "fully judicial" 153 review on habeas
of his constitutional claims.1 5 4 Thus, Pressley stands for the proposition that a court "established pursuant to article 1"155 can finally adjudicate the merits of constitutional rights, even in cases involving ten
15 6
years imprisonment. s
CONCLUSION

The purpose of the tenure clause is to restrain the federal gov57
ernment by preserving the independence of the federal judiciary.1
Thus, it is applicable only to federal courts, not to state courts as
state courts do not exercise the judicial power of the United
States.' 5 8 Courts-martial are executive tribunals, territorial courts
exist apart from the separation of powers principle, and legislative
courts are, or at least were prior to Palmore, characterized as tribunals restricted to a particular class of' business which was not considered inherently "judicial." Moreover, Congress does not stand to the
l5 9
District as a state legislature stands to a state.
Palmore, however, rejected all of' these propositions. It was the
first case to suggest that a constitutional restraint inapplicable to the
60
It
states was therefore inapplicable to the federal government.1
was also the first case to suggest that the process deemed adequate
for courts-martial was therefore adequate for civilian courts.16 1 As a

152 Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 n.6 (1970). Note that Pressley is consistent with Rizzi
in that it declined to hold that a nontenured judge was "exactly commensurate" with a tenured
one, 430 U.S. at 379-81. It did, however, decide that the lack of a tenured judge did not
render the habeas corpus relief under D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (1973) "'inadequate or ineffective." 430 U.S. at 381-83.
1s3 Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 418 n.5 (1970).
154 Thus the relationship between the suspension clause and the article III judicial power was
squarely presented, contrary to the Chief Justice's view. See note 47 supra.
155 D.C. CODE § 11-101(2) (1973). See also THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 48, at 310
(J. Madison) (legislative encroachment on other departments will first occur in subtle measures).
156 See generally Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) (reviewability of draft board
determination of draft status in draft dodging prosecution); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21,
at 342-43 (The Dialogue).
15' See notes 1-4, 16 supra and accompanying text.
15 See note 50 supra.
159 See notes 99 & 100 supra and accompanying text.
160 See notes 107 & 108 supra. Palmore perhaps should be read as the incorporation movement in headlong retreat (or triumph). Good behavior tenure, having failed of incorporation,
will not be held to restrain the federal government either. Cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430
U.S. 442, 449-61 (1977) (seventh amendment; same author, same result). Justice Harlan warned
against the pitfalls of selective incorporation, which embodies Justice White's approach. See
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129-38 (1970) (White, J., concurring).
161 Contra, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
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"practical" precedent, Palmore took the limited territorial rational and
applied it precisely where it can least apply, that is, to a court which
is neither in a transitional stage nor far from the pressures of the
federal government. 162 Moreover, it was the first case to intimate
that the way federal power is exercised abroad might be a model fbr
the way it is exercised at home. 16 3 As a "legislative" court case, it
held that the congressional power over Indian tribe membership, implied a like power to try and sentence felony cases.' 6 4
The Palmore and Pressley reasonings would be less strained if the
necessary premise of the holding were admitted forthrightly. The
Superior Court for the District of Columbia is an article III court; all of
its cases arise under the laws of the United States. 165 It is the United
States which prosecutes felonies in that court; thus, it exercises powers
inherently judicial and forbidden to the other branches, however the
separation of powers doctrine is defined.1 66 The "article I" pretense,
therefore, means nothing more than an article III court deprived of its
16 7
constitutional independence.
Insofar as the tenure clause represents not merely federal law but
the law of federalism, the result should resurrect other past arguments. 168 The remaining question is whether the future will read
each case for "the least it has to be worth." 169
162 See notes 67-74 supra and accompanying text.
164

See generally note 67.
But see notes 148-49 supra.

56

See note 100 supra.

16

See notes 148-56 supra and accompanying text.
If there is any other conclusion, one might ask how, or whether, the superior court has

163

167

the power to declare congressional statutes unconstitutional. Although in form the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia is constitutionally indistinguishable from an administrative
agency, see notes 29, 88 & 93 supra, administrative tribunals do not possess this power.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-68 (1974). As tribunals without good behavior tenure,
they are "incapable of receiving" the judicial power of the United States. American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). To say that the Superior Court possesses this power
because Congress granted it begs the question. If Congress has to allow that tribunal to hold its
statutes unconstitutional, then how may Congress determine what degree of independence it
will allow those judges? Good behavior tenure and the power of judicial review are constitutional twins; neither has any meaning without the other. See R. BERGER, supra note 145, at
117-19; notes 4 & 14 supra.
168 If Palmore, a Maryland resident, were to petition a Maryland state court for a writ of
habeas corpus, what would happen to the "meandering and poorly reasoned" rule in Tarble's
Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872) (state court may not issue the writ to federal detainee)?
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 91 (Supp. 1977). Apart from service of process problems
and assuming a ground for relief under the Constitution, what basis exists for exclusive federal
jurisdiction? The denial of certiorari is not even given weight on the merits in a subsequent
habeas petition. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 487-88 (1953) (Burton & Clark, JJ.), 489-98
(Frankfurter, J.), 513 (Black & Douglas, JJ.). What restraints did the states place upon the
federal government by virtue of the suspension clause, the tenure clause, the tenth amend-
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ment, and the enumeration of powers principle? See generally
357-60, 1513.

HART & WECHSLER,

supra at

169 HART & WECHISLER, supra note 21, at 330 (The Dial6gue); Plumb, The Tax Recommen-

dations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Tax Procedures, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1360,
1457-69 (1975), noted that the proposed bankruptcy court "goes beyond any existing precedent," id. at 1468, since a nontenured judge would be deciding cases governed by state law.
See note 20 supra. Yet, after Pressley, "article I" courts are not restricted to article I legislative
powers, unless Congress has the power to define the substantive scope of the sixth amendment
in the District of Columbia.
Whether Congress has legislative jurisdiction over all suits involving the bankrupt has
never been determined. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 474
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 146-50 (1933)
(article III grant of judicial jurisdiction over admiralty held to imply article I grant of legislative
jurisdiction). If a defendant has a right to insist upon a state, rather than federal, forum, the
right rests upon the enumeration of cases 'and controversies to which the federal judicial power
may extend. See note 18 supra. Assuming all suits involving the bankrupt are cases "arising
under" federal law, see Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 652-54, 661-62 (1947); Schumacher
v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934), surely a difficult problem, compare National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 594-99 (1949) (bankruptcy suits do not arise
under federal law within the meaning of article III) (plurality opinion rejected by a majority)
with id. at 611-13 (concurring opinion), 652 n.3 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (such suits arise
under the applicable bankruptcy statute), the defendant cannot object to federal jursidiction,
but can merely complain of the lack of tenure protections. See generally Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953). Although his claim has merit,
see note 144 supra and accompanying text, he certainly makes a less compelling case than
Palmore or Pressley presents, where the defendant presumably bears the animosity of the community and where the opposing party can influence the judge's reappointment.

